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;-:: SUMMARY OF SPACECRAFT RANGE SAFETY -_
'_'. TRAJECTORY ANALYSES FOR APOLLO MISSIONS
_';S: By Richard E. Kincade
,._,_ SUMMARY
_ This document summarizes spacecraft range safe_y trajectory analyses
_ for Apollo missions and the support provided by the Manned Spacecraft
#% Center (MSC) in order to gain flight plan approval for each mission as
_ required by the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR). The basic space-
craft range safety trajectory analyses for each mission have been com-
._ pleted, and any additional studies which may be required by the AFETR
_ will be provided upon request.
_! INTRODUCTION
_._ The AFETR provides the facilities, instrumentation, and personnel
_'_. to support missile and space vehicle testing as required by the Range
'_! user. Since there are hazards inherent in the operation of missiles
and space vehicles, it is the responsibility of the Range Safety Office
_, of AFETR to insure that all reasonable precautions are taken to mir.imize
"_.'. the risk to life, health, and _roperty.
_" The conditions which the Range Safety Office (written as the AFETR
_,- during the remainder of the report for brevity) places on a flight test
:_ may _egrade the probability of mission success. For example, in-flight i_.
4_i_' failure of range safety instrumentationsmay be the reason for flightte_nination even though there _isno apparent mission f ilure. For the
_ worst case, the AFETR may not allow a flight to take place if_the flight
}._i_ plans and vehicle configuration are not compatible with current policies _:_
_: and regulations. For such cases, the AFETR may agree to Waive certain _.....,_
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_ The effect of range safety constraints on th_ probability of mission _
success can be minimized by careful mission planning with range safety :i_
considerations in mind. This process basically consists of evaluating _:_
the tradeoffs between mission requirements and range safety requirements. _
To perform this process successfu_!y requires a thorough understanding
_i of current range safety policies, regulations, and practices. It must _!_
:: be done in the earliest mission planning stages to detect and minimize ;v_
" constraints or incompatibilities before hardware configurations are "_i
fixed. The cost of thi_ _dditional planning is insignificant compared :4_V
to the cost of late hardwa.re changes or to the possible additional risk "-,4
_ to mission success.
:'2_ Approval of the proposed flight plan by the Commander or his desig-
•_' nated safety representative is a necessary prerequisite for launch on
:( the AFETR. This approval will be final as long as the mission remains
_. within the specified limits. Approval of the flight plan does not con-
_ stitute permission to launch. Permission to launch is granted only
_; after all AFETR data requirements have been met.
_._ For NASA to gain flight plan approval and permission to lam_ch
_ Apollo Saturn IB and Saturn V missions, a"Range Safety Subpanel was
i_i- formed by the MSC, Marshall Spaceflight Center (MSFC), and Kennedy
Space Center (KSC), This panel, a subpanel of the Flight Mechanics
Panel, defines and provides trajectory support necessary to satisfy all
_ AFETR range safety requirements.
!_ AS-201 RANGE SAFETY ANALYSIS
_x The Range Safety Subpanel determined that for mission AS-201, MSC
_: would prepare the range safety trajectory data package for the space- :
_ v craft and MSFC would supply the launch vehicle data. The following
_ agreements between MSC and MSFC were made:
_ (i) MSFC would have responsibility for the range safety tra_ec-
ii__ tory data for all the launch vehicle stages, interstage, spacecraftLM adap er (SLA), and instrument unit; MSC would be responsible for the _
_ service module (SM), cc_msmd module (CM), and launch escape system (LES). i_4:''_/_'
_ (2) MSFC would provide the necessary range safety trajectory in- -ly _:'_ formation for parts of the spacecraft remaining on the launch vehicle _i_i)_
_. after an abort, i%_._!_
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_-%J. (3) MSC would provide the following information to MSFC for inclu-
_-14 sion in their range safety studies: _
"%"._, _a) Expected effects of launch vehicle destruct action on the
A% _ spacecraft components _
_'_:".,_. (b) Breakup characteristics of the spacecraft due to entry
_!_ conditions.
'--_._ (_) The spacecraft trajectory data that MSC would provide the
,_-: AFETR must include the following information for the various spacecraft
;.:" components separated from the launch vehicle.
__ (a) Expected drag coefficients and theoretical nominal impact
_ point for each component of the spacecraft, i
_ (b) Expected theoretical aborted _pact points for each com-
ponent of the spacecraft using the proper time delays when aborting
from the l_unch vehicle nominal, three-sigma maximum performance,
three-sigma minimum performance, and t_ree-slgma lateral deviation
traJectories.
(c) Maxim,m expected lateral deviation from the spacecraft
nominal flight path.
(d) Statistical analyses to determine the probabilities of
land impact and casualties for cases which involve the flight over /.....
_!i inhabited areas.
In addition to this basic data for AS-201, the AFETR required the
Range safety Subpanel to furnish a spacecraft impact dispersion analysis
and the LE8 performance characteristics, sequence of events, and aero-
dynamics. They also requested that the booster engine shutdown inhibit
be extended from 40 seconds to about 60 to 65 seconds of flight time.
Range Safety Trajectory Computations
Reference l_presents a summary of the input data, methods, and
results for the AS-201 preliminary range safety package submitted to
the AFETR to info_ them of the baoic flight plan, nominal trajectory, -_'-°'
and normominal trajectories for this mission. The package consisted
of a magnetic tape and printouts of the spacecraft nominal, three-slgma
maximum performance, three-sigma minimum performance, and three-sigma
lateral deviation trajectories from 8-1_B burnout to the end of space-
craft powered flight. The three-sigma maximum performance trajectory
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_ was obtained by perttLrbingthe command and service modules (CSM) weight, _iii_
_, service propulsion system (SPS) thrust, and SPS specific impulse. Per- _'_
_ turbation values used to generate the three-si_n_ minimum performance _._"
_ were the negatives of the perturbations used for the above three-sigma _:_i_!_<, maximum performance trajectory. The body attitude perturbation was
applied in generating _he three-sigma later_l deviation trajectories.
!_ From these trajectories and other perturbations (winds, for example),
the crossrange and downrange impact dispersions from the CM, SM, and
'_ LES nominal impact points were obtained.
i_ The final range safety package (ref. 2) was completed to provide
_ the AFETR with the operational trajectory and dispersion data associated
with this trajectory. Magnetic tapes in the AFETE format were generated
_ to include these trajectories. The three-sigma trajectory cases andP,
_, their impact dispersions were computed using the _ame methods as those
of the preliminary rang_ safety package. The results of these studies
indicated that no land areas would be in danger as the result of flying
the nominal or three-sigma trajectories.
@
A statuaryof launch aborts using the LES on Saturn Apollo missions,
as requested by the AFETR, is presented in reference 3. For this study,
nominal conditions were taken from a typical A8-201 launch vehicle tra-
Jectory, and abort trajectories were comp_ted every l0 seconds from lift-
off until nominal tower Jettison time. Tnese abort trajectories were
divided into two groups due to event sequencing differences as a func-
tion of altitude. The two groups were composed of _hose for aborts at
less than 12 000-it altitude and those at greater than 12 000-it alti-
tade. Aerodynamic parameters for the launch escape vehicle were pro-
:_ vldsd. For each abort trajectory computed, the relative velocity, rela-
tive flight-path angl_,,and altitude that were imparted to the space-
craft by the launch escape motor s_d pitch motor were also computed.
Reference _ was written to inform the AFETR of MSC's opposition
to the proposed extension of the booster engin@ shutdown capacity from
_0 to 60 seconds of flight time. MSC was opposed to this extension
since it would put the spacecraft in the region of high dynamic pressure.
Even if a recontact between the spacecraft and launch vehicle were
avoided, the separation distances were below the MSC/NAA specification
values if the time were changed to T + 60 seconds. Even with these
reasons, the_AFETR extended the range safety booster engine shutdown
capacity from T + _0 to T + 60 seconds for AS-201.
Other AFETR questions concerning off nominal spacecraft trajectories
for AS-201 wer_ answered by abort and alternate mission studi_s per-
formed by MSC. ,_
I _;')I
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_:'_ The AFETR required a probability study assessing the hazards _sso-%,
_,_ ciated with the proposed flight. The first major step specified in
_ undertaking this study was the determination of s_nificant failures
_i which ms_ les_ to range safety hazards. Reference 5 determined failure
_, modes pertinent to Apollo spacecraft components on j_8-201 and their ef-
_7_ fect on the impact points of the spacecraft. The emphasis was placed
_< on the effects of the failure or flight conditions on the instantaneous
%_ impact point of the spacecraft rather than upon the exact cause of the
_ failure. Hazardous failure modes of the Apollo CSM major subsystems
_/ were reviewed to determine the degree of hazard that would exist down-
¢,_ range to land masses in the event that such a failure occurred. The
_. specific types of failure that were considered are as follows:
(I) Hard-over tumble of the SPS thrust chamber.
(2) Failure of the SPS to ignite.
(3) Failure of the SPS to reignite. _
(_) Premature cutoff of the SPS during first and second burns.
(5) Failure of the SPS to cut off with a consequent burning until
fUel depletion.
(6) Failure of the SM reaction control system (RCS) to orient the
spacecraft to the proper attitude.
(7) Failure of the C_ RCS to orient the spacecraft to the proper
attitude.
_ (8) Failure of the CM and SM to separate.
(9) Failure of the LES Jettison motor.
The probability of occurrence associated with each of these failure .....
i_ modes or flight conditions was determined u_ing information obtained _._,._/+'_:.._.
._ fr_n histories of other space vehicles similar to the CSM. %¢_7_...._+_
Impact Probability and Estimated Number of Casualties A_alysis _j_ _ ,
After determining the ha'_ardous failure mod_s of the CSM, the eval- _;:-
u_tions of hazards to land _sses (probability _f impact on land .and ...... -,_5 ..
_, casualty expectations) associated with the reentry of the LES, SM, and ......:_'_,_'_!-:_:_
i!i- CM were made (ref. 7). In this evaluation the failure mode analysis : _:'_':_/_'_"_:'_:_
_. of reference 5 was revised and updated. It was found that of the nine _<0
_:Jv'___T ._
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failure modes considered, only certain attitude errors resulted in ira- 5)_
_-..._'_'_'_.,__.pacts of the CM or SM on downrange land masses, The impact probabilities _:"_,%_"_'
_'.,_, and casualty expectations resulting from these attitude errors were con- ,_
!_ servative because the assumptions were made that (i) there would be no
_J:'_...,_. inhibit or cutoff of the SPS burn, (2) large attitude errors were as -_- - .
,_,_, likely to occur as small attitude error_, (3) there would be no shelter
.,,,.- available for inhabitants of land impact areas, and (4) CM impacts were
•_._:_ computed assuming no landing parachutes. The results of this study, '_'!_
using these conservative assumptions, indicated small hazards to life ,_
._. and land.
i.%
Effect of L_unch Vehicle Destruct Action on the Spacecraft
_i_
_ An analysis was performed in reference 6 which determined the
_ number and characteristics of spacecraft pieces re:_ulting from launch
vehicle destruct action. The weight, drag properties, survivability,
and lethal areas of these pieces were computed. The breakups of the SM
and SLA _ere considered in three phases. In phase 1 the following actions
occurred.
(i) Destruct action was taken on the S-IVB stage.
(2) The LES operated and removed the CM.
(3) The SM and SLA remained on the booster.
Phase 2 consisted of the following:
(i) No booster destruct action occurred.
(2) S-IV_ engine cutoff took place.
(3) The SM and SLA remained on the S-IVB.
(_) The LES operated and removed the CM.
The final phase resulted in the following:
_," (1) No booster destruct action occurred.
-_, (2) S-IVB cutoff took place.
._-_i (3) The CSM separated from the S-IVB. _..<._.
_.
_;>:" (_) The SM and CM separated before reentry. ::;.°_"::"
"" (5) The SLA remained on the S.IVB.
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The results of this study (weight, drag properties, survivability,
- and lethal area of the pieces) were provided MSFC for inclusion in their
,, launch vehicle range safety package.
).
_.- AS-202 R_NGE SAFETY ANALYSIS
A
.!_ The Range Safety Subpanel decided that the basic plan for supplying
V'_'- the necessary trajectory data to the AFETR for AS-201 would also be used
,_ for AS-202. This subpane! realized that additional trajectory evalua-
-* tions would have to be made for this mission, as compared to AS-201,
_L since the nominal trajectory was to fly over many different countries
_: and islands before landing in the Pacific Ocean. A presentation of the
_. proposed AS-202 mission plan was given to the A_ETR approximately i year
"-_ in advance of the launch date to i_form them of the range safety aspects
:_- and the calculations for this mission.
range safety trajectory planned
/.._, The AFETR stated that in addition to the basic range safety tra-
,_ Jectory analyses being performed by NASA certain other range safety _
• requirements must be met before flight plan approval could be granted.
._: These requirements were:
, (i) The spacecraft trajectory must be reshaped such that the SM
_%. three-sigma impact dispersion area was not on a lu_:im_s in the event
_i of no second SPS burn. :..'
(2) A procedure acceptable to the AFETR must, be established that
_-- would prevent gross overspeeds that could result in impact on land masses
_L downrange of the expected target point.
_C
_ (3) A procedure acceptable to the AFETR must be established that
,_ would prevent an SPS burn if it appears land impact will occur as the
_ result of this burn.
_'_ Descriptions of the range safety analTses which were performed
!_ for AS-202 are found in the following sections These malyses satis-
_ lied the AFETR range safety traJectc.7 requirements.
J_._ Range Safety Trajectory Computations _.;..,.
" A preliminary range safety package (ref. 8) was submitted to the E+':_"_%_+_"AY_t_ to inform them of the proposed mission plato. The package con- _:+<_
_i-_'.- isted of the following items: _-.i'._,'-'_......' q:;_"
'_" (i) One magnetic t_pe in %he AFETR format containing trajectories '_$'.'"_'_'_%._;"
..- fr_n S-IV_ bu-nout to the end of the spacecraft powered flight for the .lj._i%,.,.%:.
!_i nominal, three-siva maxlmt_n, three-sienna minimum, and
_j_ lateral spacecraft trajectories. _"_-
1970025287-011
_ (2) Binary coded decim_l (BCD) printouts of this tape.
_i_? (3) Printouts for the nominal, three-sigma maximum, three-sigma _'_
_':- minimum, and th_ee-__a lateral _--_*_ from _-_
_!- burnout to CM entry (bOO 000 ft)
-j
J_ (_) Nominal LES, CM, and SM trajectories to impact.
•_ (5) Nominal impact points and three-sigma impact dispersion el
_ lipses for the CM, SM, and LES.
_ Perturbations of the CSM weight, SPS thrust, and SPS specific
_£ impulse were used to obtain the three-sigma maximum CSM trajectory.
__J Perturbation values used to generate the three-sigma minimum traJec-
i to_ were the negative of the perturbations used for the three-sigma
maximum CSM trajectory. The three-sigma lateral CSM traJectc "was
obtained by simulating nominal guidance with the CM target oF.set a
three-sigm_ distance to the right. These trsJectories were used in
_obtalning the three-sigma impact dispersions for the LES, SM, and 6?4.
In order to notify the AFETR of the final operational trajectory
_ to be flown, reference 9 was published. The three-sigma maximum and
_ minimum trajectories of this package wer@ computed the same as reference 8
using the appropriate S-IVB three-sigma burnout conditions. Tne three-
sigma lateral booster trajectory was not used for preparation of thisreport. Guidance analysis ind/cated that lateral dis e sions during .....
[_ CSM flight with _aidance error sources were sufficiently small so as
_ not to warrant generating lateral-deviation trajectories. Downrange
and crossr_nge dispersions were then obtained for the LES, SM, and CM
_ impacts.
_ Expected lateral deviations and tumble-turn envel-,pes for an alter-
!_, nate mission were also provided. These data were provided since there
_ Was the possibility that an alternate mission, using an SOS controlled
_ attitude during the SPS burn, might be flown in the event of guidance
_° and navigation (G&N) #ailure.
_:. Enclosure i of reference i0 presented the action taken by MSC to _ . ;:_
_:_ comply with the AFETR request for first burn retargeting such that the
_/_ SM would not endanger any laud masses if the SPS engine failed to ignite ' "
.... for the second SPS burn. It showe_ that the trajectory had been re-
" shaped in order that the SM three-sigma ir.,act ellipse would cover water :"
_:-- and not land.
_ _S _
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_• Trajectory parameters for real-time monitoring to prevent land
_-_., impact hazard during spacecraft propulsion system burns were presented
:_ in enclosure 2 of reference !0. This enclosure explained how the flight
......- controllers were to control spacecraft overspeed and skipout cases and
also their procedure for monitoring the SPS performance during flight _
::_ over Africa after a nonn_ninal S-IVB cutoff,
_.: Failure Mode Analysis _N_
i_ Reference ii presented an analysis of failure modes pertinent to
:< AS-202 spacecraft components and a determination of their effects in _'
_;:; relation to range safety. This report gave relevant historical flight i__'_
_ test results the failures considered in evaluating:hazardous failure _
_-- modes, and the asscciated probabilities of failure for these failure :_' "
_': modes, It included a discussion of all faih_e modes that may endanger
_'_. land masses together with a l ting of the land areas that may be en-
_ dangered by a particular mode of failure. Since the nominal impact
_:_ points for the SM and the CM were in a broad ocean area, the determina-
_ tion of whether or not a hazard existed was based on the change to the
instantaneous impact point (IIP) as a result of a particular failure.
_ The specific types of failures that were considered were :
_!_'=_ (i) Hard-over tumble resulting from hard-over deflection of the
: SPS chamber.
_. (2) Failure of the SPS to ignite.
::,.-
_ (3) Failure of the SPS to reignite
_i: (_) Premature cutoff of the SPS.
_-_ (5) Failure of the SPS to cut off followed by a burning until
_.._ fuel depletion.
y (6) Failure of the SCS. _"
":: (7) Failure of the SM RCS.
:_ (8) Failure of the CM RCS.
t
(9) Failure of the CM and SM to separate. '
(i0) Failure of the G&N system. ',_"
t_. •
(Ii) Failure of the LES Jet%ison motor. "_
t
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Impact Probability and Estimated Number of Casualties Analysis
_ Since this mission was to fly over land areas, it was necessary
_. to perform a very comprehensive hazard study for AS-202. _ne prima_y
_: objective of reference 13 was to determine the hazards to land massesL'(._
_ (both probabilities of impact on land and the associated estimations
_ of human casualties) associated with (I) a successful flight, (2) fail-
}_-- ures which may occur subsequent to the S-IVB phase of flight, and
2_ (3) alternate missions. Updated failure mode analyses were used to
. predict the in-flight reliability performance of the spacecraft. The
modes of failure that were determined to be of primary interest to
_i_ this study were :
_ (i) A premature th;mst termination of the first SPS burn.
_/_ (2) A premature thrust termination of subsequent SPS burns.
_ (3) A slow turn during the first or subsequent SPS b_rns. !
i_ (_) A hard-over tumble during the first or subsequent SPS burns.
)_ (5) An attitude control failure during a coast phase with a ""
_: resultant attitude error for the subsequent burn.
(6) A failure to start the SPS engine for the first burn.
_ (Y) A failure to restart the SPS engine for any burn subsequent
to the first burn.
_ (8) A failure to terminate thrust of the SPS engine at the end
of the first burn with burning continuing antil propellant depletion.
.... Hazard ostimates were then calculated for the nominal mission,
_ premature thrust termination of the first SPS burn, premature thrust
_ termination of the second burn, premature thrust termination of the
_ third burn, premature thrust termination of the fourth burn, a hard-
_! over tumble during the first burn, a hard-over tumble during the second
_. burn, a hard-over tumble during the third burn, a hard-over tumble
_,_. during the fourth burn, a _ailure to ignite for any of the _four
burns, a thrust termination failure for any of the four burns, a f
gradual turn during any of the four burns, and an attitude mis- -.:_ _,_
orientation during any of the four burns. :"_"_,"
i
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_ Alternate mission hazards were calculated for (i) a successful
spacecraft alternate mission resulting from an S-IVB premature thrust
_ terminatfon, (2) a secondary failure of the spacecraft during the alter-
_ nate mission following an S-IVB premature thrust termination, and
_¢ (3) an alternate mission of the spacecraft made necessary by a G&N fail- _
_, ure after alignment for the second burn. _
[ ,-
_° This study indicated that failures during the nominal or alternate _;_
_: missions would result in small probabilities of killing or injuring _
_ people in lands flown over.
_!] Effect of Launch Vehicle Destruct Action on the Spacecraft _
_. /_mal,yses performed for this mission (ref. 12) were essentially the
same as those completed for ?_S-201 (ref. 6). Since only m_nor varia-
_ tions in weight and propellant loads existed, the spacecraft configura-
_ tion used in determining breakup characteristics was similar. This
breakup study was included _n the MSFC launch vehicle range safety
_i package.
i_ AS-204RANGESAFETYm_ALYSlS
The AFETR requires that trajectory information be furnished from
lift-off to a point in flight where effective thrust of the final stage
has terminated or to thrust termination of the burn which places the :'....
vehicle in orbit. The AFETR required no spacecraft trajectory data
other than what was supplied in the MSFC range safety package for the
_. following reasons :
_ (1) _e spacecra_, _-as to be manned for this mission.
_--_\ (2) The spacecraft was to remain on the launch vehicle up to and
_ during orbit insertion for the nominal mission.
;_' (3) Spacecraft abort and alternate mission studies revealed no
_._ hazards to land.
_i_ The following sections describe the range safety trajectory analysescompleted for this m_ssion. _, _
i_ Range Safety Trajectory Computations _+I_S_
_ The nominal and three-sigma impact data for the launch escape
_17- tower (LET) were calculated and provided to MSFC for inclusion in their '_....
_ range s_fety package.
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q_ Studies were made by MSC whicn recommended that the time of booster .J_
_ engine cutoff enable be lift-off plus 40 seconds. This setting of lift-
_ off plus 40 seconds would insure no recontacts between the spacecraft _
_ and the booster. The AFETR accepted this setting for all manned Apollo/ _
_ Saturn IB flights;-_
_! Effect of Launch Vehicle Destruct Action on the Spacecraft
_? Reference l_ i_entified the effect of launch vehicle destruct ac-4L-
i_ tion on the portions of the Apollo spacecraft remaining on the Saturn
_! booster following an abort of t_e booster and removal of the CM. The
_ abort and subsequent destruct action was considered in three phases of
!_: the ascent flight. These phases are identified below.
_ Phase i.- Mission abort near launch pad during first 40 seconds of
_ flight.
_ Sequence of events: (i) The abort is commanded.
o_[<- (2) LES removes the CM (SM and SLA remain on
_ " the booster)
_
(3) Dest['uct action taken on the booster.
Phase 2.- Mission abort after 40 secon_ a_d before LES nominal
Jettison.
Sequence of events: (i) The abort is commanded.
_!_ (2) Booster engine thrust cutoff.
_ (3) LES removes the CM (SM and SLA remain
on the booster).
_;? (_) Destruct action taken on booster, if
necessary.
Phase 3.- Mission abort after LES Jettison.
• Sequence of events: (I) The abort is commanded.
(2) Booster engine thrust cutoff.
(3) SM and SLA separate.
_ SM engine operates and removes the CSM
_i (SLA panels remain-on the booster).(5) Destruct action taken on the'booster, i_ :_o_
necessar#.
The number, weight, estimated velocity, reference area , estimated
drag coefficient, and lethal area of the pieces resulting from the above
destruct action were given to MSFC for inclusion in their range safety _
package. __4_
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AS-206 RANGE SAFETY ANALYSIS i!_
The AFET_ has tentatively agreed that the traJe_-tory data t_Lrnished i_
for this mission by MSFC will be sufficient for range safety requirements
_: for the following reasons: i_
(I) The LM is to remain on the booster until orbit insertion for
the nominal mission.
(2) There is no LES provided for this mission. --
(3) The spacecraft abort and alternate mission studies provide
__ land impact data for nonnominal missions.
LJ_
_._ No spacecraft trajectory informat2on has been supplied to the AFETR
•,_ as a result of this tentative agreement. In the event the AFETR does
_' require any special spacecra_ range safety studies, they will be per-
_ formed either by MSC engineers or under an M_SC/TRW Task.
_ Effect of Launch Vehicle Destruct Action on The gpacecraft
Reference 15 presented the analysis of the effect of booster ex-
_ plosion on the LM and the SLA, the structure breakup of the LM and the
_ SLA as the result of this explosion, and the initial velocities and
_,_? ....
_-_ lethal areas of the resulting pieces. The following abort and destruct
_ ground rules were assumed for the analysis of this particular mission
!i_ and configuration:
_o4. (i) Unless the dynamic pressure is below 1.0 psf, the LM will
_!_ remain on the booster during an abort.
i_ (2) Subsequent to any abort during the powered flight up to the
,_}'_= time of orbit insertion, the destruct signal will be sent if the booster
:-_ (plus the remaining spacecraft components) appears to violate range
,;. safety constraints.
_ Based on these ground rules, it ,:;as determined that the ,ffects :--
_ of destruct action may be experienced during any part of the booster
!!_ powered flight 'up to orbit insertion. The results of this analysis
_ were forwarded to MSFC for inclusion in their range safety studies.
3
I
_4
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-_- AS-501 R_/_GESAFETY ANALYSIS _
_._ The AFETR has also agreed that trajectory information supplied by
:_ .MSFC would suffice for this mission, This agreement was made since the
_J
_; spacecraft is to remain on the booster until orbit insertion except for
>_ off-nominal cases_ The off-nominal cases are to be covered by the abort
f_
_; and alternate mission plans also furnished to AFETR range safety. Any
i':_ spacecraft studies that may be required by the AFETR will be completed
_" upon request.
:!_ Range Safety Trajectory Computations
The LET three-sigma impact dispersions (downrange, uprange, cross-
range) for the 500-series missions were computed using the three-sigma
maximum, minimum, and lateral booster trajectories, the three-sigma high
and low LET Jettison motor impulse, the three-sigma high and low LET
Jettison motor angle, and three-sigma winds on the LFY. These three-
sigma impact dispersions and the LET nominal impact data were given to
MSFC as an addition to their launch vehicle range safety analysis.
_-L__ The AFETR questioned the choice of a 72° launch ezimuth for AS-501
_%_ and AS-502 since the S-IVB dwell time across Africa could be signifi-
_ cantly decreased by choosing launch azimuths from approxlmate_y 90° to ....
105 ° The results of reference 16 showed that the expectation of casual-
_: ties for a 72° azimuth is less than or nearly equal to those for launch
_ azimuths between 90° and 105 °. Other trajectory information proved that
_;_, the 72° flight azimuth was mandatory to _tlfill the tracking requirements
_ for these missions. As a result of this data the AFETR has agreed that
_4_ a launch azimuth of 72° for this mission is Justifiable.
_ MSC requested that the booster enable cutoff times _ set at lift-
_" off plus 30 seconds. This recommended time setting would allow the
_ launch escape vehicle to perform a safe abort well_with!n the separation
_ constraint criteria. The AFETE has accepted this setting for AS-501. _
L"
• .._.4j-.'J_'_,
.... ffl_,,:_,_,
1970025287-019
15
!;j Effect of Launch Vehicle Destruct Action on the Spacecraft
Reference 17 investigated two phases of ascent flight during which
an abort _md subsequent destruct action might occur. These phases were¢
ss follows :
; (i) during #light from lift-off to LES Jettison when the SM, SLA,
and the I_ test article (LTA) will remain on the booster,
_ (2) during the flight from LES Jettison to S-IVB first burn cut- '
_ off when both the SLA panels and the LTA will remain on the booster.
The number, weight, reference area, lethal area, and approximate
!_ incremental velocity of the pieces resulting from destruct action on
_. the S-IVB were computed and forwarded to MSFC for their use.
AS-502 RANGE SAFETY ANALYSIS
_ No spacecraft range safety trajectory information, other than what
_ is supplied by MSFC, has been requested by the AFETR for the same rea-
sons as those given for AS-501. As in the case of the preceding missions,
_-_. special data requirements will be fulfilled upon request.
_ Range Safety Trajectory Computations
_ It was determined that the LET impact dispersion ellipse computed
for AS-501 was also applicable to the AS-502 .LET. The nominal LETimpact for AS-502 was computed and w_s forwarded along with this impact
_2
•_!_ dispersion ellipse to MHFC for inclusion in their range safety analysis.
_ Effect of Launch Vehicle Destruct Action on The Spacecraft
Since the spacecraft configuration (i.e., SM, LTA, and SLA) is •
essentially identical to the AS-501 configuration, and the ascent
trajectory and increased dynamic pressure resulting from destruct action
are very slmil_r to those for AS-501 (ref. 17), it was determined that _;
the structural breakup resulting from destruct action on the booster l_:_!_:_J_
is expected to be the same as for m_.ssion.AS-501. _FC_ was notified -_,,_,_:-'-:_
by reference 18-to use the A_-501 res',Its in their AS-_02 range safety _j_._ ,
analyses. , _'_'_:_-
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?_¢," AS-258 RANGE SAFETY ANALYSIS
Since boZh the AS-205 and AS-208 missions are placed into orbit,
!i! no spacecraft range safety trajectory work (other than what is covered
..... in the MSFC range safety am_21.yses) has been requested by the At_TR.
_ The LET impact data will be computed as soon as the nominal trajectory
_ is finalized. Any other range safety studies will be performed as
_ requested.
Z Effect of Launch Vehicle Destruct Action on The Spacecraft
_ The investigation made in reference 19 considered the ascent
_ phase of AS-205 (manned) to LET Jettison and the AS-208 (unmanned)
_7 ascent-to-orbit-injectlon phase. During these ascent trajectories, an
abort of the mission was assumed to occur if the booster malfunctioned
_., or an impending failm'e was indicated. The objective of this investi-
_% gation was to analyze the effect of a destruct an_ any impending ex-
plosion on the SM and SLA for the AS-205 launch and on the LM and SLA
for the AS-208 launch. Estimates of the size, weight, expulsion velo-
city, and lethal areas of the pieces were determined for each launch
and provided to MSFC.
AS-503 RANGE SAFETY ANAT,YSIS
The AFETR has indicated that no spacecraft range safety trajectory
_ com_utations (other than those contained in the MSFC range safety pack-
age) will be necessary for this mission.
Effect of Launch Vehicle Destruct Action on The Spacecraft
An analysis was performed to determine the effect of launch
vehicle destruct action on the SM, LM, and SLA for this mission, i
Reference 20 presents the destruct induced environment realized by the _i_:
spacecraft _, the mode of spacecraft structural _reakup, and the initial
velocities and lethal areas of the resultSng pieces. This information
was forwarded to MSFC for inclusion in their launch "_ehicle range
safety analyses. _,_
0
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_ The AFETR spacecraft traJec'aory requirements for thi_ mission should
% be the same as those for the preceding orbital missions Any special
_ studies for the spacecraft will be performed by MSC.
Effect of Launch Vehicle Destruct Action on The Spacecraft
Reference 21 evaluated the effect of launch vehicle destruction
and explosion on the SM, LM, and SLA. The number, weight, reference
_ area, lethal area, and approximate incremental velocity of the pieces
resulting from launch vehicle destruction were given. This d_ta will
_ be included in the launch vehicle range safety plan.
CONCLUSIONS
_. The spacecraft _ange safety studies performed by MSC and TRW were
invaluable in the early phases of the Apollo program. Since the AFETR
was especially concerned about a new spacecraft which had never been
launched on the AFETR, it ws_ very important that MSC farnish them with
all information required for a new type program. ._SC furnished all
this required spacecraft information for AS-201 and AS-202 and aided in :,
gaining flight plan approval for these missions.
Since the majority of range safety ans_yses for orbital flights
is concerned with the launch vehicle, it would appear that the space-
craft range safety studies are of minor importance. This is not true
since it is very important to supply MSFC with the results of the launch
vehicle destruct action on the spacecraft. Without this Information a
true picture of the total hazards r_su_tlng fro_ m launch vehicle de-
struction could not be made. In addition, the AFE_ is always request-
ing r&_Age safety information and data concerning the abort and alternate
mission planning for each flight and the rationale for selecting the
various flight plans. This information a_d _ta _st be supplied by :_T_
MSC before flight plan approval can be granted _
1970025287-022
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